The Myth Of Nabucco: Greed, Delusion and $11.4
Billion
Inside Beltwayistan, a number of Bushevik oil patch zombies
still roam the recession-blasted landscape mindlessly chanting their Caspian
mantra, “Happiness is multiple pipelines” - with the caveat that they flow
westwards and bypass both
Russia and
Iran.
They’ve now added a new word to their vocabulary, “Nabucco,” and worse, have
bitten a number of Obama administration officials and visiting European
politicians, who have joined their shuffling ranks.
Their thinking remains somewhat clouded by primordial
memories of Bush’s “fuzzy math,” as the statistics about Nabucco are
contradictory, to say the least. State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic
(SOCAR) vice president Elshad Nasirov is now threatening to start selling
Azerbaijan’s
natural gas, currently Nabucco’s sole projected provider of throughput, to
Asian countries if
Europe further postpones Nabucco’s
construction.
Construction of the 56-inch, 2,050-mile pipeline, first
proposed in 2002, is tentatively slated to begin next year and scheduled for
completion by 2014. At a cost initially estimated at $11.4 billion and rising,
Nabucco will be the most expensive pipeline ever built, more than three times
the cost of the 1,092-mile Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. Raising such
a significant sum in a time of global recession would be an article of faith at
best.
Even assuming that Nabucco’s boosters manage to assemble a
coterie of deep-pocketed suckers – er, investors, the only promised current
volume for Nabucco's proposed 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) annual throughput
is Azerbaijan's future offshore Caspian Shah Deniz production, estimated at 8
bcm. Even if Shah Deniz does end up supplying Nabucco, its currently promised
throughput leaves a deficit of 23 bcm, leading to the question of exactly whose
natural gas will Nabucco carry if SOCAR drops out, a worst case scenario
requiring the Nabucco consortium to scrounge not 23 bcm, but all 31 bcm per
annum, especially as Washington’s geopolitics invalidate the participation of
either Russia or Iran?
For those with knowledge of energy history in the
post-Soviet space, the 419-mile, $500 million Odessa-Brody oil pipeline,
completed in 2001, provides a cautionary tale to building pipelines without
throughput guarantees. The Ukrainian government rashly built the self-financed
line without foreign investment, stretching from its Black Sea port to the
Polish border to provide
Central Europe with oil despite
not having firm commitments from a single oil producing nation for export
throughputs. After the pipeline remained unused for three years, a reluctant
Kiev
was forced in 2004 to agree to transport Russian oil southwards in the opposite
direction, for export from
Odessa
rather than northwards to Central European markets as originally envisaged.
Further complicating the picture are the differing proposed
transit and pricing policies of the countries that Nabucco will pass through.
The biggest geographical hurdle impacting the bottom line is the fact that, if
as some Nabucco boosters aver,
Turkmenistan
can be persuaded to contribute natural gas, the seabed of the Caspian has yet
to definitively be delineated amongst the sea’s five riparian states. The
question remains unresolved 18 years after the implosion of the
USSR
dashed the 1920 and 1941 Soviet-Iranian bilateral treaties covering the issue
of offshore waters. Building a pipeline across seabed whose ownership is in
dispute will enrich maritime lawyers, but few others.
The issue of competing claims over Caspian national waters
and seabed is hardly a pedantic exercise. In July 2001
Iran
dispatched military aircraft and a warship to intimidate two Azerbaijani survey
vessels contracted by BP to leave the Alov-Araz-Sharg field, a site that
Azerbaijan
claimed was well within its national sector, but disputed by
Iran.
It seems unlikely
Russia and
Iran
would stand idly by as trans-Caspian sub-sea pipelines, which exclude them, are
constructed.
Hopes of Turkmen gas filling Nabucco’s gas deficits are yet
more wishful thinking. Last month the Central Asia–China gas pipeline
connecting
Turkmenistan’s Caspian
shore natural gas fields to Xinjiang was inaugurated in the presence Chinese
President Hu Jintao,
Turkmenistan’s
Gurbanguly
Berdymukhamedov,
Kazakhstan’s
Nursultan Nazarbayev and
Uzbekistan’s
Islam Karimov. This year 13 bcm are scheduled to transit the new pipeline,
rising to 30 bcm by the end of 2011 and over 40 bcm by 2013, effectively
soaking up
Turkmenistan’s
projected natural gas increases for the foreseeable future. Any further gas
from
Kazakhstan,
an even more distant proposition, would face the same geographical constraints
as regards the Caspian, while Gazprom also soaks up its surplus natural gas
production.
Which leaves any but the most deluded Eurocrats and
Beltwayistan apparatchiks with an uncomfortable “fuzzy math” question – which
of the five Caspian riparian states of
Azerbaijan,
Iran,
Kazakhstan,
Russia and
Turkmenistan
are going to provide Nabucco’s projected 31 bcm annual throughput?
But never mind – driving Nabucco is a complex skein of
greed, European foreign policy agendas and the ongoing belief, a delusional
legacy of the Bush administration, that somehow Caspian energy “belongs” to the
West, and furthermore, that both Russia and Iran will complacently stand back
while Western capitalism pulls off another energy initiative dwarfing BTC.
European interest in Nabucco is underpinned by the
unpleasant realization that since 1991 it has become more and more dependent
upon
Russia for natural gas imports,
with
Russia’s state monopoly Gazprom
now supplying 40% of
Europe’s imports. As
Moscow
still largely relies on its Eastern European Soviet-era pipeline network, the
annual winter spats between
Moscow and
Kiev
over payment rates and transit have deeply traumatized
Brussels
to conduct a frantic search for alternatives in a desperate attempt to achieve
energy security. Nabucco is designed to carry Caspian and Central Asian natural
gas via
Turkey and the Balkan states
to
Austria while bypassing both
Russia
and
Ukraine.
A situation that can only worsen with time, as the EU’s
European Commission projects that the EU’s gas consumption will increase by as
much as 61 percent from its current level of 502 bcm to 815 bcm by 2030.
The hard sell has now begun over Nabucco thus represents the
answer to Eurocrats’ prayers. Nabucco’s consortium shareholders are
Austria’s
OMV,
Hungary’s MOL,
Bulgaria’s
Bulgargaz,
Romania’s
Transgaz,
Turkey’s
Botas and
Germany’s
RWE with 16.7 percent apiece. Notably, none of the countries involved has any
significant natural gas production of their own.
If Nabucco is to succeed, there is one potential supplier
that could step into the supply void, but for
Washington,
it is a country too far –
Iran.
Iran contains 16 percent of the
world's natural gas reserves, second only to
Russia.
Washington has clearly and repeatedly stated its
opposition to including
Iran in
Nabucco, as last month U.S. Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Richard
Morningstar stated, "We have been constantly saying that, in our opinion,
Iran
is not in a position to become a part of any new projects in the Southern
Corridor."
In response, speaking after a Dec. 8 Iran-UAE joint economic
commission meeting in
Tehran,
Iran’s
Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki bitingly observed, "We have never
heard that Europeans have entrusted the Americans with their authority to
decide on the pipeline." Motakki then added a blunt dose of reality, stating,
"Speaking about the Nabucco pipeline without
Iran's
participation would amount to nothing but a pipeline void of gas."
Mottaki’s comments echoed those of Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who
said in March that Nabucco was not feasible without Iranian participation.
Nabucco also has its local critics. Azeri political
scientist Ilgar Velizade has noted that Nabucco's high cost, now estimated at
$11.8-13.1 billion, is simply untenable in the context of the current global
financial crisis. Velizade consequently believes that the less expensive
Poseidon pipeline option, which would deliver natural gas to
Italy
from Shah Deniz, could be as important for Europe,
Azerbaijan
and
Turkey as
Nabucco.
Are the Azeris serious, or are they just bluffing, hoping to
stampede a tidal wave of investment cash into Nabucco? Hedging its bets,
Baku
is already exploring alternative markets for its gas. On Dec. 26 SOCAR
President Rovnag Abdullayev said that while under the terms of an Oct. 14
contract under whose terms
Azerbaijan
was to supply 500 million cubic meters (mcm) of gas to
Russia
beginning Jan. 1, his company would now double the amount to 1 bcm. While this
represents a fraction of that promised to Nabucco, Gazprom has already
indicated that it will happily purchase any increases in Azeri natural gas
production at world prices.
Nabucco remains stoked by the increasingly passé ideological
concerns of a Bush-era administrative legacy promoting pipelines bypassing both
Russia and Iran further fuelled by Brussels’ fears of ongoing Ukrainian-Russian
pricing spats disrupting deliveries as in years past. In the meantime,
Moscow
undoubtedly will press forward with its Nord Stream and South Stream gas
pipelines alternatives in an attempt to reassure Europe that Russian pipelines
bypassing
Ukraine
will alleviate future concerns about energy security.
The zombies have gotten their wish – Caspian energy now
indeed does flow through new multiple pipelines. The only problem for the
wizards of Wall Street and the City is that they now flow mostly eastwards, to
China.
As for Nabucco, what is Azeri for “expensive white elephant, son of
Odessa-Brody?”
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This article was written by John C.K. Daly for OilPrice.com.
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